This introduction to the volume begins with a manifesto that puts forward two theses: first, that the sciences are the best place to turn in order to understand causality; second, that scientifically-informed philosophical investigation can bring something to the sciences too. Next, the chapter goes through the various parts of the volume, drawing out relevant background and themes of the chapters in those parts. Finally, the chapter discusses the progeny of the papers and identifies some next steps for research into causality in the sciences.
A manifesto
One might think that the sciences are the last place one should look to gain insights about causality. This is because, due to influential arguments of Karl Pearson, Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell at the turn of the twentieth century, research scientists have for a long time taken great pains to eradicate causal talk from their research papers and to talk instead of associations, correlations, risk factors and other ephemeral properties of data. Thus the traditional home of the study of causality has been within the field of metaphysics in philosophy -a field that has in its turn been treated sceptically by many scientists.
Our first thesis is that, on the contrary, the sciences are the best place to turn in order to understand causality. We maintain this thesis for a variety of reasons.
First, as explained in Section 1.2.5, causal talk became more respectable in the sciences at the turn of the twenty-first century, thanks to attempts to mathematize the notion of cause. It is now becoming clearer that causal reasoning is of central concern to scientists in many fields, as well as to philosophers, and it is fruitfully pursued as a project of mutual concern.
Second, although causal talk was unfashionable in the twentieth century, causality never really went away: scientists' claims were always intended to inform policy, experiment and technology, and such applications require causation, rather than mere association which tells us nothing about what happens when we intervene to change the world.
Third, the concept of cause is changing, and the sciences are at the forefront of these changes. In Aristotle's time causality was understood as explanation in general: the search for causes was a search for 'first principles', which were meant to be explanatory. However, now causal explanation is usually thought of as just one kind of explanation. In the modern era, causality became tied up with the notion of determinism, the prevailing scientific view of the world in Newtonian times. But determinism fell out of favour in science due to the advent of quantum mechanics. Moreover, a non-deterministic notion of cause became increasingly relevant to science (in medicine, for example, claims like 'smoking causes cancer', where the cause is not sufficient to ensure the effect, became quite acceptable), and causality lost its deterministic connotations. If attempts within science to mathematize the notion of cause should prove successful (though this is controversial), the current concept of cause may be replaced by some formal explication, as happened so systematically with the concept of probability. It is science that is driving change in the concept of cause.
Fourth, the field of metaphysics generally benefits immeasurably from interactions with the sciences. Our understanding of time and space, for example, is derived from the use of these notions in physics, just as our understanding of what an organism is (and could be) is derived from the biological study of organisms. It is part of the job of any scientific field to decide what the constituents of its field are, whether that is four-dimensional space-time, bacteria, or market transactions. This is the same question that is faced at a higher degree of abstraction by the metaphysician concerned with what the constituents of the world are. It is bizarre to try to answer those questions without looking at how the same questions are dealt with in the sciences.
Our second thesis is that scientifically-informed philosophical investigation can bring something valuable to the sciences, too. As can be seen in this volume, many scientific fields are wrestling with the same methodological problems concerning causality. Different sciences use different languages and different paradigmatic examples, which can obscure the fact that they are facing the very same problems. But philosophers of science are in a natural position to identify common ground in the methods they encounter across the sciences. These philosophers are becoming increasingly well-informed about the sciences and so able to exploit that position in order to identify best practice. Of course philosophers are also well placed to identify any conceptual problems that they encounter in the methods developed in the sciences and to clarify the very concept of cause that these methods appeal to.
We think, then, that the most promising way forward in understanding causality and making methodological progress is as a mutual project between philosophically-minded scientists and scientifically-informed philosophers. We hope that this volume is testimony to the fruitfulness of this way of looking at causality in the sciences.
The core issues

Health sciences
While biomedical issues have long been a concern of ethicists and phenomenologists, only very recently have the health sciences become prominent in the debates of philosophers of science and philosophers of causality. It is now clear that the health sciences are an inspiring source for methodological, epistemological and metaphysical issues concerning causation. The chapters in this part of the volume testify to the increasing awareness of both philosophers and practising scientists that biomedical research shares with other domains a number of concerns, from the conditions for inferring causation from correlational data to the definition, use, and role of mechanisms. What triggered philosophers to pay more attention to this domain has been the rise of the so-called evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement. Although the first works by the epidemiologist Archie Cochrane going in this direction date from the early 1970s, the term was coined and started to be customarily used only in the early 1990s. The main result has been the production of the socalled 'evidence-hierarchy', i.e. a list ranking methods for causal inference from the strongest (notably, meta-analyses of randomized controlled trials) to the weakest (notably, expert opinion). Evidence, it seems, is the pillar of science and the tenets of EBM are well-entrenched. But these strongholds have been under attack for the last 10 years at least. The battle to set the debate straight is happening in this volume too.
For instance, in Causality, theories, and medicine Paul Thompson argues against RCTs as the gold standard of causal inference in medicine. Ultimately, Thompson's critical target is statistical methods alone as reliable tools for causal inference. His argument largely hinges upon the crucial differences between trials in biomedical contexts and in agricultural settings, where Fisher first developed the methods of randomization. He thus emphasises the role of theory and of background knowledge in establishing causal claims. Thompson's emphasis on the role of 'non-statistical' elements in causal inference is also shared by Alex Broadbent in Inferring causation in epidemiology: mechanisms, black boxes, and contrasts and by Harold Kincaid in Causal modelling, mechanism, and probability in epidemiology. They turn attention to the contentious issue of whether causal claims in epidemiology are supported by mechanisms and, if so, how. Broadbent in particular opposes the 'mechanistic stance' and the 'black box stance' in epidemiology. He thoroughly discusses pros and cons of taking mechanisms as necessary or sufficient to establish causal claims. He also investigates assumptions and consequences of taking mechanistic considerations in causal assessment to be descriptive or normative. Kincaid, on the other hand, focuses on the use of mechanisms, hoping to make observational studies in epidemiology 'more formal' and consequently stronger.
In The IARC and mechanistic evidence, Bert Leuridan and Erik Weber focus on yet another aspect of using mechanisms. Their philosophical considerations about causality and mechanisms are more specifically applied to the procedures for evaluating carcinogenicity of agents by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). They argue for an evidential role of mechanisms. Mechanisms help in excluding confounding, that is when one or more variables interfere and confound the 'real' causal relations. This may lead IARC panels to conclude that an agent is carcinogenic when it is not, and vice versa. A more theoretical contribution is that of Donald Gillies in The Russo-Williamson thesis and the question of whether smoking causes heart disease. Gillies specifically addresses the thesis, put forward in Russo and Williamson 2007 , that evidence of both difference-making and mechanisms are needed to establish causal claims. Using examples from the studies on smoking and heart disease, Gillies refines the thesis, requiring that mechanisms be 'plausible' rather than 'confirmed' or 'well established'.
The leitmotif of the chapters of this part seems to be that (pace EBM partisans) there is more to causation in health contexts than simply statistics. This, as we shall see next, is a thread followed also in the investigations on causality in psychology. Likewise, chapters in the psychology part share concerns about the role and import of difference-making and mechanistic information for disease causation or causal assessment. Another relevant aspect highlighted by this sample of works in the health sciences is that debates on conceptual issues such as mechanisms are not pursued in abstract terms but are meant to positively contribute to the discussions about the 'use' of causality, for instance in IARC procedures.
Psychology
Psychology has a history of paying serious attention to the philosophical literature and of valuing rigorous philosophical clarification of the basic concepts and distinctions of psychology. Philosophy has not always returned the compliment. As a result, many philosophers will be unaware of the explosion of work in psychology on all aspects of causal reasoning. This fascinating work should be of interest not only to philosophy but also to any area of science that is wrestling with causality.
Psychologists test empirically how people do reason, not directly how people should reason. Nevertheless, empirical results are of direct interest to other fields. Psychologists test 'folk intuitions' on causal reasoning, which is a useful check on whether philosophers' intuitions are systematically different from those of the unphilosophical folk. For the rest of science, primarily concerned with the normative aspect of causal reasoning, psychology can find out which weaknesses and fallacies we are susceptible to in our causal reasoning, and in which circumstances we do better -or worse.
The first three chapters in this part give a taster of this growing psychological literature. In Causal thinking, David Lagnado brings to bear a body of empirical work to criticize the usual practice in psychology of separating the study of causal learning (learning about a causal structure) and causal reasoning (reasoning on the basis of a known causal structure). Lagnado argues that studying both aspects together -on the basis of a psychological process account of causal reasoning -will be superior. In When and how do people reason about unobserved causes?, Benjamin Rottman, Woo-kyoung Ahn and Christian Luhmann similarly use a body of empirical work to argue that people's reasoning about unobserved causes is more sophisticated than has been recognized. Reasoning about unobserved causes is a big problem for inferring causation from correlation -a concern of almost any science. In particular they examine patterns that people infer in data that deviates from simple correlations and conclude that there is a dynamic interplay between observed and unobserved causes that any attempt to explain causal learning must consider. Clare Walsh and Steven Sloman, in Counterfactual and generative accounts of causal attribution, argue that there is evidence that people think about both counterfactuals and mechanisms in forming causal judgements. They go on to examine reasoning about prevention or causing an absence, noting that there is considerably less consensus on prevention than on positive causation.
The remaining chapters are more philosophical, and illustrate how integrating psychological and philosophical work can benefit both disciplines. In The autonomy of psychology in the age of neuroscience, Ken Aizawa and Carl Gillett examine the issue psychologists or neuroscientists face when they discover more than one neurological realizer for what was initially treated as a single psychological phenomenon: do they keep a single psychological phenomenon, with multiple realizers, or do they decide that after all there was more than one psychological phenomenon? Aizawa and Gillett argue, with reference to the discovery of the neural realizers of colour vision, that the higher-level theory plays an essential role in this choice. It is worth noting that Baetu's chapter in Section 1.2.4 examines the same theme with regard to classical genetics and molecular biology. Otto Lappi and Anna-Mari Rusanen, in Turing machines and causal mechanisms in cognitive science, argue that explanation using abstract representations in Turing machines illustrates limitations of the account of mechanistic explanation put forward in recent years in the philosophical literature on mechanisms. Finally, in Real causes and ideal manipulations: Pearl's theory of causal inference from the point of view of psychological research methods, Keith Markus sets out a detailed examination of Pearl's account of causal reasoning (see Section 1.2.5), when applied to psychology. Markus discusses ways in which Pearl's formalism should be interpreted and argues that it has certain limitations in the context of psychology.
This part thus develops themes arising in psychology itself and from examination of psychology -but which are also of vital interest to other sciences. If it is true that reasoning to a causal structure and reasoning from a causal structure influence each other, as Lagnado argues, then that is of concern to the many scientists whose work is related to either or both forms of reasoning. The issue of scientific taxonomy, or how a field should chop up its domain, is of wide concern, as is examination of the limitations of highly successful inference methods such as those based on Pearl. Finally, mechanisms and their position in causal judgements, and explanations, are clearly of increasing interest. The use of mechanisms in causal reasoning is now a substantial debate in psychology, that has come from philosophy, and -on the basis of much of this volume -is rapidly becoming a debate of interest right across the sciences.
Social sciences
The social sciences are another area that took time to attract the interest of philosophers of causality and of philosophically-minded scientists. It has perhaps been methodological advancements, especially in quantitative research, that have enabled the social sciences to shake off an inferiority complex with respect to the hard sciences. Arguably, the social sciences still cannot establish the same kind of laws as physics, but the use of more rigorous methods has allowed a much deeper understanding of many social phenomena, and more accurate predictions and well-informed interventions through social policy. Moreover, recent debates in philosophy give room for rethinking even traditional debates in social science. This is the case, for instance, in the contributions Causal mechanisms in the social realm by Daniel Little and Getting past Hume in the philosophy of social science by Ruth Groff. On the one hand, Little endorses causal realism and asks what ontology is to be developed for the social realm. He argues for mechanisms, but within a microfoundations approach: in social contexts 'causal mechanisms are constituted by the purposive actions of agents within constraints'. Little also makes clear that such an ontology in the social context is overtly anti-Humean, because causation is not in regularities but in mechanisms. Humeanism is also the critical target of Groff. Notably, she discusses how the tacit Humean metaphysics can be by-passed in social science and touches on issues related to methodological individualism and causal powers. Although Groff does not offer any definite positive arguments, she nicely builds bridges between the traditional philosophy of science literature, stances in analytic philosophy, and the methodology of social science. The kind of anti-Humeanism argued for in these two chapters concerns metaphysics, namely whether or not all there is about causation is the regular sequence of effects following causes in time. The line of argument of Little and Groff may also be extended to epistemological considerations, namely whether or not in order to know about causal relations all we have to do is to track regular sequences of effects following causes in time. An attempt to challenge 'epistemological Humeanism' has been carried out by Russo and Williamson (2009a, b) for the social sciences and for epidemiology. Russo has argued that causal epistemology hinges upon the notion of variation. Simply put, model building and model testing is about meaningful joint variations between variables of interest; conditions of invariance of parameters or regularity of occurrence are instead constraints to ensure that variations are causal rather than spurious or accidental. Arguments given in Section 1.2.2 seem to suggest that psychologists also track variations rather than regularities.
In the next group of chapters, two main issues come up: mechanism and structure. In Causal explanation: recursive decompositions and mechanisms, Michel Mouchart and Federica Russo tackle the problem of causal explanation in social science research, especially quantitative-oriented research. They present the structural modelling approach as a means to causally explain a social phenomenon and advance the view that the core formal tool -i.e. the recursive decomposition -needs to be interpreted in mechanistic terms. In Counterfactuals and causal structure by Kevin Hoover, structural modelling has a slightly different facet. 'Structural' does not refer to the structure or mechanism that the recursive decomposition represents, but to the structural equations. Hoover's structural account hinges on Simon's notion of causal ordering, and the key aspect is the invariant parametrization of the system. The two chapters have in common, though, that structural modelling is an alternative to a manipulationist or interventionist account à la Woodward (Woodward, 2003) . Simply put, manipulationist accounts hold that x is a cause of y if, and only if, were we to manipulate or intervene on x, some change in y would accordingly follow (with the usual caveats of holding fixed any other factor liable to interfere in the relation between x and y). Interestingly enough, manipulability theories now enter philosophical discussions in a different way. It seems that the importance of the notion of manipulation is not so much in providing an explication of the concept of causation, but rather in explicating other notions, e.g. that of 'constitutive relevance' used by Craver (2007) . In The error term and its interpretation in structural models in econometrics, Damien Fennell also considers structural models based on Herbert Simon's notion of causal ordering, and in particular examines issues related to the error term in the equations. The goal of the chapter is mainly expository, in making those who use these kinds of models in econometrics aware of conceptual issues that can hinder successful and meaningful results. In the last chapter A comprehensive causality test based on the singular spectrum analysis, Hossein Hassani, Anatoly Zhigljavsky, Kerry Patterson and Abdol S. Soofi discuss a new statistical method for testing causal relations not in the tradition of structural modelling, but rather in the tradition of Granger's approach. In this approach causality does not lie in the structures or mechanisms identified in the joint probability distributions, but, to put things very simply, it lies in the power of a (set of) cause-variables to convey information in order to predict the effect-variable.
The second group of chapters, and in particular Hoover's, is closely related to issues also addressed by Judea Pearl and Nancy Cartwright in Section 1.2.5: counterfactuals and structural models, structural models and external validity, going beyond statistics in drawing causal inferences. It is also worth mentioning that most chapters again deal, either directly or indirectly, with mechanisms. A possible explanation is that one may require more than probabilities to give a satisfying conceptual analysis of causation. Perhaps probabilities are not enough even from a methodological point of view: large parts of these methodological chapters invoke, albeit in different ways, mechanisms. The fact that so much emphasis is given to mechanisms may be due to a shift of focus from probabilities to mechanisms. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that probabilities do not play any role in the explication of causation.
Natural sciences
The natural sciences, and particularly physics, are the traditional source for philosophers of science, and for many years natural scientists have taken an interest in the philosophical literature on their field. This part begins with chapters representing the established but growing interest of philosophers in the biological sciences. These engage with topics from mechanism discovery in molecular biology to mathematical modelling in evolutionary biology. The increasing diversity of engagement between philosophy and the natural sciences is also represented by work on the far newer climate science. The part closes with two chapters demonstrating the cutting edge of work on causality emanating from physics.
In Mechanism schemas and the relationship between biological theories, Tudor Baetu looks at the relationship between classical genetics and molecular biology, and argues that there are cases where the accommodation of data from molecular biology results in better classical explanations. For example, Marfan, Loeys-Dietz and Ehlers-Danlos syndromes can be confused as a single genetic disease, but they are different -and this has implications for their treatment. Baetu argues that this means that classical genetics and molecular biology are not merely parallel explanatory projects, but related. He offers an account of this relation in terms of mechanism schemas. Note that this chapter is thematically linked to the chapter by Aizawa and Gillett in Section 1.2.2. The common concern is with when a difference in lower-level realiser (for Baetu, biochemical molecules; for Aizawa and Gilett, neural systems) matters to the higher-level theory (for Baetu, classical genetics; for Aizawa and Gillett, colour vision), when it does not, and why.
Roberta Millstein turns to our concept of chance in Chances and causes in evolutionary biology: how many chances become one chance. Millstein argues that at least seven colloquial uses of chance in evolutionary biology can all be translated into the Unified Chance Concept (UCC) by specifying the types of causes that are taken into account (i.e. considered), the types of causes that are ignored or prohibited, and the possible types of outcomes. The UCC is useful, Millstein argues, because it makes it easier to translate between the colloquial chance concepts, and also from them to more formal probabilistic language. In Drift and the causes of evolution, Sahotra Sarkar takes a very different approach. Drift is an explanation for evolutionary outcomes which are not due to natural selection, mutation, migration or the other recognized causes of evolution. There is always deviation from expected outcomes due to these causes, and this is drift. Sarkar works in the framework of mathematical modelling of evolutionary processes. He distinguishes between the constitutive and the facultative assumptions of a model. The constitutive assumptions define the model, and cannot be changed without changing the system, while the facultative assumptions can vary. So the facultative assumptions give you the causes which act against the background conditions that are given in the constitutive assumptions. Sarkar takes whether the initial size of a population is finite or infinite as a constitutive assumption, and builds a simple mathematical model to show that this models drift, satisfying the usual conditions for drift. But drift is in no facultative assumption of this model. All that is required for drift is that the population be of a finite size; this finite size is part of the conditions under which the evolutionary causes -selection and mutation -operate. Sarkar concludes that drift is not a cause of evolution.
In the chapter, In defense of a causal requirement on explanation, Garrett Pendergraft examines whether equilibrium explanations, which explain an observed equilibrium state of a dynamical system by providing a range of possible initial states and possible causal trajectories of the event being explained, violate Pendergraft's Causal Factors Requirement: an explanation of an event must provide information about the causal factors that influenced whether or not that event occurred. Pendergraft argues that equilibrium explanations satisfy this, since they do provide information about causal factors. In so far as drift is an explanation of evolutionary outcomes in terms of chance, the question of whether or not it is a cause of evolution is a link between Millstein and Sarkar's work, and Pendergraft's.
Paolo Vineis, Aneire Khan and Flavio D'Abramo, in Epistemological issues raised by research on climate change, examine some of the epistemological challenges faced by climate change research. This is an area with special challenges for coming to causal conclusions, since randomized experiments cannot be done, but only experiments on microenvironments artificially constructed in the laboratory, where the results don't always extrapolate to the real world, and some highly speculative attempts to control real weather, such as to make rain by seeding clouds. This chapter considers particularly the example of rising levels of certain diseases that can clearly be traced to rising salt levels in Bangladesh, and whether we can say that climate change caused these diseases.
One interesting account of causality that emanates from the traditional engagement of philosophy with physics is the process theory of causality (Reichenbach 1956; Salmon 1998; Dowe 2000 ). Reichenbach's seminal idea, taken up and developed by Salmon, held a process to be causal if it is capable of transmitting a mark. Salmon and Dowe later adopted a version of the theory according to which a causal process is one that transmits or possesses a conserved physical quantity such as charge or angular momentum. In Explicating the notion of 'causation': the role of extensive quantities, Giovanni Boniolo, Rosella Faraldo and Antonio Saggion present a development of the process theory, in which conserved quantities are replaced by extensive quantities. An extensive quantity is defined as a quantity whose value is given by the volume integral of some function defined over space-time points. Extensive quantities include conserved quantities like angular momentum and charge, but also quantities such as volume and entropy.
For Reichenbach, causal relationships were also characterized probabilistically. His probabilistic theory was based around the common cause principle, which says roughly that if two events are probabilistically dependent but neither causes the other, then there is some set of common causes of the two events that screens off the dependence (i.e. the two events are probabilistically independent conditional on the common causes). Miklós Rédei and Balázs Gyenis, in Causal completeness of probability theories -results and open problems, investigate the question of when the common cause principle is satisfiable. It turns out that in some probability spaces it is possible to satisfy the principle but in others it is not. Their chapter considers both classical and non-classical probability spaces and presents the state-of-the-art concerning what is known about this problem.
On the surface these chapters are very different, arising from different concerns from different scientific fields. But there are some common themes at work here, and in the rest of the volume. The concern of Vineis, Khan and D'Abramo over difficulties with randomized experiments also arises in Section 1.2.1, on the health sciences, and in Section 1.2.5, on computer science, probability and statistics. The issue of mechanisms arises here, as elsewhere. For Baetu, understanding mechanisms and mechanism discovery is vital to understanding the relation between theories, while for Pendergraft the challenge is better to understand different approaches to explanation. The overall project of better understanding explanation is also reflected in the chapter by Lappi and Rusanen examining mechanistic explanation in Section 1.2.2.
The work on mechanisms is, on the face of it, very different from the work on causal processes originating in physics, but there are commonalities in the role of mechanisms and processes in causal explanation and inference, as developed in Section 1.2.6.
Computer science, probability and statistics
As discussed earlier, in the face of criticisms from Mach, Pearson and Russell, in the twentieth century research scientists largely avoided explicit discussion of the causal claims that were implicit in their papers. But certain developments at the turn of the millennium have helped to rehabilitate explicit talk of causality in the sciences, and now 'causality' is no longer a dirty word. It is in the context of these developments that the chapters of this part of the book should be placed.
The 1980s saw the beginning of a revolution in the use of causal methods in the sciences, stemming from interest amongst computer scientists and statisticians in probabilistic and graphical methods for reasoning with causal relationships. Of course revolutions don't just pop out of thin air, and there were several -rather disjoint -lines of thought that led to these important advances. Notably, philosophers of science attempted to characterize causal relationships in terms of patterns of probabilistic dependencies and independencies, and represent them graphically using 'causal nets' (Reichenbach 1956) ; computer scientists used graphs that chart probabilistic dependencies and independencies to construct computationally tractable representations of probability distributions (see, e.g. Chow and Liu 1968); statisticians were also using graphical models to represent dependence and independence relationships in the analysis of contingency tables (Darroch et al. 1980) . In the 1980s these advances led to Bayesian net methods for causal reasoning (Pearl 1988) . Here causal relationships are represented by a directed acyclic graph and causality is tied to probability via the causal Markov condition, which says that each variable in the network is probabilistically independent of its non-effects, conditional on its direct causes (see, e.g. Williamson 2005) . In the 1990s these methods were reconciled with the use of structural equation models to handle causal relationships -a formalism, stemming from work in the 1920s, that is essentially very similar to the Bayesian net approach (Pearl 2000) . As can be seen from the chapters in this part of the book, the Bayesian net approach, and more generally the approach to causality stemming from recent developments in computer science, probability and statistics, remains a thriving area of interesting research questions and lively debate.
In Causality workbench, Isabelle Guyon, Constantin Aliferis, Gregory Cooper, André Elisseeff, Jean-Philippe Pellet, Peter Spirtes and Alexander Statnikov focus their attention on methods for the automated learning of causal models directly from data. Hitherto, the field of machine learning in computer science has primarily concerned itself with the task of generating models that are predictively accurate. Broadly speaking, predictive accuracy merely requires that the model adequately capture the underlying probability distribution. Recently, however, there has been some demand for models that are explicitly causal, in order to predict the effects of interventions. Thus a supermarket may wish to use shopping data not only to predict which aisles will need stocking most regularly but also to determine where to move a particular product in order to increase sales of that product. Causality workbench presents and discusses an exciting new testbed for computer systems that attempt to learn causal relations directly from data.
The standard approach to learning causal relationships from data is to find a Bayesian net with the least number of arrows from all those that fit the data, and to interpret the arrows in the graph of that net as characterizing the causal relationships. In When are graphical causal models not good models?, Jan Lemeire, Kris Steenhaut and Abdellah Touhafi argue that this approach may be unsatisfactory. By appealing to ideas concerning Kolmogorov complexity, used widely in computer science in the context of data compression, they argue that the correct causal model may not be a minimal Bayesian net.
Under the standard machine learning approach, the probabilities of a Bayesian net that has been learnt from data are usually simply the frequencies induced by the data. But Bayesian nets were originally conceived of as belief networks: the probabilities in the net were supposed to represent degrees of belief that would be appropriate for an agent to adopt given the evidence of the data (Pearl 1988) . In Why making Bayesian networks objectively Bayesian makes sense, Dawn Holmes argues for a return to the Bayesian, degree of belief interpretation. But rather than advocating the usual subjective Bayesian approach, according to which degrees of belief are subject to rather loose constraints and are largely a question of personal choice, Holmes advocates objective Bayesianism, which holds that degrees of belief are typically subject to tight constraints that leave little or no room for personal choice (Jaynes 1957; Williamson 2010) . The key question is: given certain causal and probabilistic evidence, which Bayesian net best represents appropriate degrees of belief? This question has been tackled by Williamson (2005) and Schramm and Fronhöfer (2005) , as well as in a distinct line of work culminating in Holmes' chapter.
Bayesian nets are normally construed as representing causal relationships in a qualitative way, via the arrows in the graph of the net. But one might suspect that causality is a matter of degree, in which case the question arises as to how one could measure the extent to which one variable causes another. This question is taken up by the next two chapters. Probabilistic measures of causal strength, by Branden Fitelson and Christopher Hitchcock, presents a detailed comparative analysis of a plethora of measures of causal strength that have been put forward in the literature on causality. Kevin Korb, Erik Nyberg and Lucas Hope, in their chapter, A new causal power theory, argue that a good measure of degree of causal power can be constructed by appealing to concepts from information theory in computer science -in particular to the concept of mutual information, a concept that is very natural in this context and which underpins, for example, the approach of Chow and Liu (1968) alluded to above.
A quantitative view of causal relationships also forms the backdrop of Multiple testing of causal hypotheses by Samantha Kleinberg and Bud Mishra. Their chapter seeks to use methods from computer science and statistics to determine those causal hypotheses that are significant in the statistical sense. Rather than framing their approach in the Bayesian net formalism, which can struggle to cope with the kind of time-series data under consideration in this chapter, Kleinberg and Mishra develop a framework using other methods from computer science, in particular temporal logic and model checking. They apply their approach to microarray data, to neural spike trains, and also to data concerning political speeches and job approval ratings.
Machine learning methods for constructing Bayesian nets can be categorized according to whether or not they attempt to discover latent variables, i.e. variables which are not themselves measured in the data but which are causes of two or more variables that are measured. Latent variables are important to many sciences, not least to psychology which typically uses factor analysis to discover unmeasured common causes (cf. the chapter of Rottman et al. discussed in Section 1.2.2). In Measuring latent causal structure, Riccardo Silva presents an approach to learning causal relationships that explicitly represents latent variables as nodes in the graph of the Bayesian net. This approach is applied to an example concerning democracy and industrialization and to an example concerning depression.
Judea Pearl, in The structural theory of causation, continues his programme of providing a mathematical formalism for causality that unifies approaches to causal reasoning that are extant in the sciences. After explaining the core features of his new theory -which extends the Bayesian net approach of Pearl (1988) and the structural equation approach of Pearl (2000) -Pearl discusses how his new theory can underwrite counterfactual conditionals (conditionals whose antecedents are false), a topic already encountered in Hoover's chapter earlier in the volume. Pearl argues that his account supersedes attempts by philosophers of science to provide a probabilistic analysis of causality, and should be preferred to the potential-outcomes (also called potential response) approach that emerges from work by Neyman and Rubin (Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974) .
The potential response approach is also discussed by Sara Geneletti and Philip Dawid in Defining and identifying the effect of treatment on the treated. They argue that their decision-theoretic version of the Bayesian net approach can be viewed as a generalization of the potential response approach. Moreover, they argue that their approach can be used to formulate and measure the effect of treatment on the treated, an important measure of causal strength that applies to cases where those who are treated are to some extent self-selected.
Statistical and machine learning methods examine data involving a sample of individuals and make general causal claims on the basis of this data. (As Geneletti and Dawid emphasize, one needs to be very careful not to overgeneralize at this stage.) Then policy makers need to apply the general causal claims to a group of individuals who require remedial action in order to identify the most effective interventions. This two-stage process is the focus of Nancy Cartwright's chapter, Predicting 'it will work for us': (Way) beyond statistics. Cartwright argues that statistical methods alone will not guarantee the success of either stage of the process. The second stage, Cartwright maintains, needs to be informed by case-specific causal models, concerning the group of individuals who will be treated, and this requires local knowledge about that group that goes well beyond the original dataset. On Cartwright's account, general causal claims are claims about tendencies or capacities and the first stage needs to be backed up by theoretical knowledge of the domainknowledge of the mechanisms that are responsible for the regularities in the data. (This latter view accords with Thompson's chapter, discussed in Section 1.2.1.)
Causality and mechanisms
This final part of the volume examines mechanisms and their relationship to causality. Mechanisms are important to causal explanation, as one way of explaining a phenomenon is to point out the mechanism responsible for it. As we see in the parts on Health Sciences, Section 1.2.1, and Social Sciences, Section 1.2.3, mechanisms are of increasing importance in causal inference. (See also Russo and Williamson, 2007; Russo and Williamson, 2011; Illari, 2011) . As we see in the part on Psychology, Section 1.2.2, mechanisms are also important in causal reasoning (reasoning from a known causal structure). It seems that mechanisms are of interest to every aspect of thinking about causality. The widespread feeling that investigating mechanisms is a fruitful avenue to explore is illustrated in the sheer number of chapters in this volume that touch on the methodology, epistemology and metaphysics of mechanisms in some way or another. This is a very clear case where philosophical theorizing about the methodology of science is of interest right across scientific disciplines. And while these chapters are more theoretical than those in other sections, since they are not examining an issue arising in a single scientific field, they are all aiming to contribute to scientific work, and are scientifically informed. These chapters illustrate the sheer breadth of interesting work concerning causality and mechanisms, stretching from the very idea of mechanism, their metaphysics, and the applicability of particular conceptions of mechanism across scientific domains.
In The idea of mechanism Stathis Psillos disentangles two historical ideas of mechanism. The first is the mechanical conception of mechanism, that mechanisms are configurations of matter in motion subject to mechanical laws. Psillos examines Poincaré's critique that such mechanical mechanisms are too easy to envisage to be informative, because if there is any possible configuration of matter in motion that can underpin a set of phenomena, then there is an infinity of such configurations. The second idea of mechanism is the quasi-mechanical conception of mechanisms, where a mechanism is any arrangement of parts into wholes in such a way that the behaviour of the whole depends on the properties of the parts and their mutual interactions, where this is what constitutes their unity. Psillos discusses Hegel's critique that the unity that such mechanisms possess is external to them, because of the need to identify a privileged decomposition out of those available, and so the idea that all explanation is mechanical in this sense is devoid of content. Psillos argues on the basis of these two critiques that mechanisms are not the building blocks of nature, so undermining the metaphysics of mechanisms, but that nevertheless the search for mechanism is epistemologically and methodologically useful. This is a valuable critical historical introduction to the idea of mechanism, against which many of the other chapters can be seen as developing a distinct new notion of mechanism.
The first two chapters engage with the metaphysics of mechanisms. In Singular and general causal relations: a mechanist perspective, Stuart Glennan examines the relation between singular and general causal relations -the difference between Fred's taking penicillin curing him, and penicillin in general curing certain forms of infection. Glennan argues that the simplest reason for preferring singularism from a mechanista's perspective (the perspective of someone promoting mechanisms for at least one of the three purposes outlined above) is because mechanisms are particulars -particular things. Glennan then argues for singular determination, which is the view that any causal interaction is a singular case of causal determination, where any causal generalisation is true merely in virtue of a pattern of such singular instances. For Glennan, this is the best metaphysical view of the fundamental components of mechanisms since it offers a unified singularist view of these, with the singularist view of mechanisms themselves as particulars. Phyllis McKay Illari and Jon Williamson, in Mechanisms are real and local, examine the implications of two widely shared premises concerning mechanistic explanation: that mechanistic explanation offers a welcome alternative to traditional laws-based explanation, and that there are two senses of mechanistic explanation: epistemic and physical explanation. They argue that in mechanistic explanation, mechanisms are treated as both real and local, and argue that reality and locality require an active metaphysics for the components of mechanisms, illustrated using Cartwright's capacities approach.
The next two chapters both address the idea of a causal link, or causal continuity. In Mechanistic information and causal continuity, Jim Bogen and Peter Machamer set out to give a novel account of causal continuity in terms of mechanistic information. They use examples of Crick's early conception of gene expression and a sensory-motor reflex in the leech to argue that mechanistic information can be understood in terms of goals served by mechanisms, and the reach or strength and independence of influence of initial stages of the mechanism on the final stages. Information is ineliminable because the continuity of some mechanisms is a function of their teleological structure, i.e. the goal of the mechanism, and so without attention to the teleological structure, the vital continuity is lost. This chapter has potential implications for the epistemology and methodology of mechanisms, along with their metaphysics. In The causal-process-model theory of mechanisms, Phil Dowe addresses the issue of the applicability of causal process theories -such as his own view, mentioned in Section 1.2.4, that causal processes involve the maintenance of conserved quantities -to areas of science other than physics. Dowe considers the need for an account of what it is that scientists look for when they look for something that underlies correlations as an important motivation for his account. If processes involve a spatiotemporally continuous link between cause and effect, then processes cannot involve absences, which would be a gap in a causal process. But absences are sometimes cited as cause or effect, such as in: 'my failure to water the plants caused their death'. An absence of watering is said to cause a positive outcome. Dowe offers an account of causal relevance in mechanisms, which can incorporate his theory that causation involves causal processes understood in terms of conserved quantities, but which also allows absences in causal explanation.
Meinard Kuhlmann, in Mechanisms in dynamically complex systems, examines whether the concept of mechanism can be extended to cover systems that are not just compositionally complex, but exhibit complex dynamicswhat he calls 'dynamically complex systems'. These dynamics arise from the interaction of the system's parts, but are largely irrespective of many properties of these parts. Kuhlmann uses detailed examples of dynamical systems in analysis of heart beat, and financial markets, to argue that dynamically complex systems are not sufficiently covered by the available conceptions of mechanisms. He explores how the notion of a mechanism has to be modified to accommodate this case.
Julian Reiss, in Third time's a charm: causation, science, and Wittgensteinian pluralism, examines pluralism about causality: the claim that there is no single correct account of what cause means, but instead multiple concepts of cause. Reiss examines three different accounts that all reject any attempt to define 'cause' in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead they regard different instances of causal relationships such as 'pulling', 'pushing', 'breaking' or 'binding' as sharing family resemblances at best: pushing and pulling clearly share something in common, as do breaking and binding, but there is no single property shared by all instances of such causal terms. This is a pluralist tradition inspired by Wittgenstein and shared by Anscombe, Cartwright, and Machamer, Darden and Craver, and is a form of pluralism about causality that interests many working on mechanisms. Reiss argues for the third form of pluralism, which he says is a form of inferentialism: the method of verifying a causal claim -of evidentially supporting it -determines with what other claims it is inferentially related.
In different ways these chapters are attempting to give an account of mechanisms suitable to their place in causal explanation, inference and reasoning. It is their place in explanation that drives Glennan's emphasis on singularism, and Illari and Williamson's related examination of locality, while Machamer and Bogen, and Dowe's very different attempts to give an account of the causal link -if successful -are important to the usefulness of mechanisms to causal inference. One ambition is also for a single account of mechanism that is applicable across scientific disciplines. Ultimately, the hope is for a general account of mechanisms -the first glimmerings of which can be seen here -which fruitfully addresses all three methodological uses of mechanisms in all scientific disciplines. This is ambitious, and it remains an open question whether it will be possible.
papers on all three: on causality and probability and mechanisms, and the question of how probabilistic accounts of causality can mesh with mechanistic accounts of causality desperately needs answering. This suggests that a first hot topic for future research will be on causality, probability and mechanisms, bridging the causality-probability agenda on the one hand, and the causalitymechanisms agenda on the other hand.
Although successful formalisms exist for handling aspects of causal reasoning using probabilities, few are explicitly designed for handling mechanisms (see however the discussions of the possible mechanistic interpretations of models in social research in Section 1.2.3). Indeed, a detailed formal understanding of causal reasoning using mechanisms is sorely lacking. So a second hot topic is likely to concern formalisms for handling mechanisms, particularly in causal inference and reasoning. Such formalisms may emerge from the existing formalisms for reasoning using probabilities (e.g. Bayesian nets or multilevel models), or they may need to be entirely new -tailor-made methods for handling causal mechanisms.
A number of chapters invoke mechanisms as evidence for causal tasks, e.g. for the assessment of carcinogenicity. Interestingly, in biomedical and social contexts alike scientists are suggesting that the 'mechanistic picture' is more complicated than it may look at first sight. They are thus moving towards 'ecological views', namely approaches that aim to include both biological and socio-economic factors in the same mechanism. This suggests a third hot topic will be to develop pan-scientific causal methods. In particular, we are in need of accounts where (i) the concept of mechanism permits the inclusion of factors of different natures, (ii) factors of different natures can provide multiple points of epistemic access to the same mechanism, and (iii) formal models can handle factors of different natures.
Having presented three questions that are likely to feature in future research, we should make some cautionary remarks about how these questions might be solved. We suggested in our manifesto (Section 1.1) that theorizing about causality is best pursued as a collaborative project involving both philosophers of science and scientists from different disciplines and fields. But such a broad project poses two related challenges.
Causality is at the crux of metaphysical, epistemological and methodological issues in the sciences. And different participants in the debate have different primary concerns. The first challenge in theorising about causality is to avoid blurring these three kinds of issue, remaining explicit about which kind is being addressed, and how. For example, the question above of how to integrate ontologically different factors in the same mechanism has metaphysical, epistemological and methodological facets. Yet giving a methodological answer to someone concerned about the metaphysics of this question, or vice versa, will not help them.
Nevertheless, the metaphysics, the epistemology and the methodology of causality are not wholly distinct. We should expect answers to any one of the three kinds of issue to have implications for the other two kinds. The second challenge is to produce an understanding of causality that successfully addresses all three kinds of issue in a unified way, without blurring the distinctions between metaphysics, epistemology and methodology. To make progress on this requires making explicit how metaphysics, epistemology and methodology impact on each other. This is challenging. Note that Cartwright (2007) is pioneering in this regard, urging that questions of metaphysics, methods and use cannot be successfully addressed in isolation. Cartwright makes it clear that she thinks an understanding of causality that does not help us address how causal claims inform policy will never be adequate.
In an era of concern about the 'impact' of research, philosophers have to make the effort to explain why and how philosophical discussions of causality have a bearing on policy and other questions of intervention and control. But scientists also need to make an effort to step back and think of the coherence of the foundations of their work: a 'methodological salad' -an eclectic mix of methods -will inspire no confidence at all unless unifying foundations can be found for the ingredient methods.
In sum, while a sound understanding of causality can best be gained though a mutual project involving the sciences and philosophy, care must be taken not to make progress on metaphysics at the expense of epistemology and methodology, or vice versa.
